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Art & the “Public Trust” in Municipal 
Bankruptcy 
BRIAN L. FRYE* 
ABSTRACT 
In 2013, the City of Detroit filed the largest municipal bankruptcy 
action in United States history, affecting about $20 billion in municipal 
debt.  Unusually, Detroit owned its municipal art museum, the Detroit 
Institute of Arts (“DIA”) and all of the works of art in the DIA collection, 
which were potentially worth billions of dollars.  Detroit’s creditors wanted 
Detroit to sell the DIA art in order to satisfy its debts.  Key to the 
confirmation of Detroit’s plan of adjustment was the DIA settlement, under 
which Detroit agreed to sell the DIA art to the DIA corporation in exchange 
for $816 million over 20 years. 
The bankruptcy court approved the DIA settlement as fair and in the 
best interests of the creditors because it found that Detroit could not, would 
not, and should not sell the DIA art.  The bankruptcy court’s conclusion 
that Detroit could not sell the DIA art was wrong.  It could and did sell the 
DIA art.  But the bankruptcy court’s effective conclusion that Detroit was 
free to sell the DIA art on its own terms was correct. 
The Detroit bankruptcy and DIA settlement suggest that art museums 
should be permitted and even encouraged to sell works of art in order to 
preserve the rest of their collections and continue operations.  Professional 
standards that prohibit art museums from selling works of art for any 
purpose other than purchasing works of art are unjustified and should be 
abandoned. 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 18, 2013, the City of Detroit, Michigan filed for municipal 
bankruptcy under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code.  It was the largest 
municipal bankruptcy filing in United States history, affecting about $20 
billion in municipal debt to pensioners and bondholders. 
 
* Spears-Gilbert Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky School of 
Law. J.D., New York University School of Law, 2005; M.F.A., San Francisco Art 
Institute, 1997; B.A, University of California, Berkeley, 1995. Thanks to Chris 
Frost for his invaluable advice, to Christopher Bradley and Matthew Bruckner for 
their thoughtful comments, and to Melissa Jacoby and Kara Bruce for their helpful 
suggestions. 
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During the bankruptcy proceedings, Detroit proposed several draft 
plans of adjustment, which increasing numbers of its creditors accepted.  
Ultimately, the bankruptcy court had to decide whether to approve 
Detroit’s final plan of adjustment, which the overwhelming majority of its 
creditors had accepted.  Among other things, the bankruptcy court 
considered whether Detroit could and should sell certain works of art that it 
owned in order to satisfy its creditors. 
Unlike most cities, Detroit owned its municipal art museum, the 
Detroit Institute of Arts (“DIA”), and all of the works of art in the DIA 
collection, which were potentially worth billions of dollars. Detroit’s 
creditors argued that that the DIA art was a non-core asset that could and 
should be liquidated in bankruptcy.  The DIA corporation and the Michigan 
Attorney General argued that Detroit could not sell the DIA art, because it 
owned the art subject to the public trust, a charitable trust, and gift 
restrictions specific to particular works of art. 
While Detroit initially considered selling the DIA art, ultimately it 
argued that it could not, and should not, sell the DIA art.  Detroit’s final 
plan of adjustment included the “DIA Settlement” or “Grand Bargain,” 
under which Detroit would transfer the DIA art to the DIA corporation, in 
exchange for contributions of $816 million over twenty years from the DIA 
corporation and other charities, which would be used to partially satisfy 
Detroit’s debt to its pensioners. 
The bankruptcy court confirmed Detroit’s final plan of adjustment, 
including the DIA settlement.  It concluded that the DIA settlement was 
fair and in the best interest of the creditors, because Detroit could not, 
would not, and should not sell the DIA.  First, the court found that Detroit 
could not sell the DIA art, listing the arguments advanced by the DIA 
corporation and the Michigan Attorney General, but not identifying a 
specific basis for its finding.  Second, the court found that Detroit would 
not sell the DIA art, and that it lacked the authority to force Detroit to sell 
the DIA art.  Third, the court found that Detroit should not sell the DIA art, 
because the DIA was necessary to Detroit’s economic recovery. 
The court’s finding that Detroit could not sell the DIA art was 
incorrect on the facts and the law.  Detroit owned most or all of the DIA art 
outright, not subject to the public trust, a charitable trust, or gift 
restrictions.  Nothing prevented Detroit from selling some or all of the DIA 
art.  Indeed, not only did the court implicitly acknowledge that Detroit 
could sell works of art from the DIA collection in order to purchase other 
works of art, but also the DIA settlement literally amounted to the sale of 
the DIA art to the DIA corporation. 
However, the court correctly found that the DIA settlement was fair 
and in the best interests of the creditors.  Because creditors had not relied 
on the DIA art as collateral, the court could not force Detroit to sell the 
DIA art, and Detroit reasonably believed that preserving the DIA collection 
was necessary to its economic recovery.  Accordingly, the DIA settlement 
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and Detroit’s final plan of adjustment provided the largest recovery that the 
creditors could reasonably expect under the circumstances, and was better 
than the only alternative, which was rejection of the plan of adjustment. 
Detroit correctly decided to sell the DIA art to the DIA corporation in 
order to ensure that it could satisfy its obligations to its pensioners.  But 
professional standards prevent most art museums from making the same 
decision.  That is wrong.  The Detroit bankruptcy and the DIA settlement 
support the conclusion that art museums should be permitted, and even 
required, to sell works of art when necessary to continue operations. 
I. MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY UNDER CHAPTER 9 OF THE BANKRUPTCY 
CODE 
Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code allows “municipalities” to file for 
bankruptcy under certain circumstances.1  Congress first enacted municipal 
bankruptcy legislation in 1934, but the Supreme Court held that the 1934 
Act was unconstitutional because it exceeded the authority granted to 
Congress by the Bankruptcy Clause by violating state sovereignty as 
guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment.2  Congress enacted revised 
municipal bankruptcy legislation in 1937, and the Supreme Court held that 
the 1937 Act was constitutional because it required the consent of the state 
and the majority of the creditors.3  And in 1942, the Supreme Court held 
that states could compel unwilling creditors to join a plan of adjustment of 
municipal debts.4 
While Chapter 9 has existed for quite some time, municipal 
bankruptcies are relatively rare.  Fewer than 700 municipalities have filed 
bankruptcy petitions under Chapter 9 since it was enacted in 1937.  By 
comparison, in 2016 alone there were 523,394 bankruptcy petitions filed 
under Chapter 7, 7,380 bankruptcy petitions filed under Chapter 11, and 
302,193 bankruptcy petitions filed under Chapter 13.5  Moreover, the 
overwhelming majority of municipalities that have filed for bankruptcy 
under Chapter 9 are special tax districts, municipal utilities, and small 
towns that have not issued public debt.  As a consequence, much of the law 
governing municipal bankruptcy is sparse and undeveloped.6 
 
 *   11 U.S.C. §§ 901-46 (2012). 
 2.  Pub. L. No. 251, 48 Stat. 798 (1934); See Ashton v. Cameron Cty. Water 
Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513 (1936). 
 3.  Pub. L. No. 302, 50 Stat. 653 (1937); United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938). 
Bekins is generally understood to have overruled Ashton sub rosa, insofar as Ashton held 
that a state could not consent to federal infringement of its sovereignty under the 
Bankruptcy Clause, and Bekins held that it could. Id. at 41-43. 
 4.  See Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942). 
 5.  See Report F-5A, U.S. Bankruptcy Court (Mar. 31, 2016), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/f-5a/bankruptcy-filings/2016/03/31. 
 6.  See generally Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and Strategic 
Use of Municipal Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281 (2012). 
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A. Eligibility for Bankruptcy Protection Under Chapter 9 
Under the Bankruptcy Code, only a “municipality” can file for 
bankruptcy under Chapter 9.7  The Bankruptcy Act defines a 
“municipality” quite broadly as a “political subdivision or public agency or 
instrumentality of a State.”8  As a result, the entities eligible to file for 
bankruptcy under Chapter 9 include cities, counties, townships, school 
districts, and public improvement districts, as well as fee-based public 
entities like bridge authorities, highway authorities, and gas authorities.  
While only municipalities can file for bankruptcies under Chapter 9, 
municipalities cannot file for bankruptcy under any other chapter of the 
Bankruptcy Code.9 
A municipality is eligible to file a bankruptcy petition under Chapter 9 
only if: (1) it is authorized by the state to file for bankruptcy; (2) it is 
insolvent; (3) it wants to adjust its debts; and (4) it has either negotiated a 
plan to adjust its debts or cannot negotiate such a plan.10  These eligibility 
requirements can complicate municipal bankruptcy filings, and can prevent 
some municipalities from filing for bankruptcy. 
First, a municipality is eligible to file for bankruptcy only if it “is 
specifically authorized, in its capacity as a municipality or by name, to be a 
debtor under such chapter by State law, or by a governmental officer or 
organization empowered by State law to authorize such entity to be a 
 
 7.  See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(1) (2012) (“An entity may be a debtor under chapter 9 of 
this title if and only if such entity . . . is a municipality”). 
 8.  11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (2012). 
 9.  11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (2012) (“The term ‘person’ includes individual, partnership, 
and corporation, but does not include governmental unit.”). 
 10.  11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2012) provides: 
An entity may be a debtor under chapter 9 of this title if and only if such entity— 
(1) is a municipality; 
(2) is specifically authorized, in its capacity as a municipality or by name, to be a 
debtor under such chapter by State law, or by a governmental officer or 
organization empowered by State law to authorize such entity to be a debtor under 
such chapter; 
(3) is insolvent; 
(4) desires to effect a plan to adjust such debts; and 
(5) (A) has obtained the agreement of creditors holding at least a majority in 
amount of the claims of each class that such entity intends to impair under a plan 
in a case under such chapter; 
(B) has negotiated in good faith with creditors and has failed to obtain the 
agreement of creditors holding at least a majority in amount of the claims of each 
class that such entity intends to impair under a plan in a case under such chapter; 
(C) is unable to negotiate with creditors because such negotiation is impracticable; 
or 
(D) reasonably believes that a creditor may attempt to obtain a transfer that is 
avoidable under section 547 of this title. 
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debtor under such chapter.”11  Fifteen states have authorized municipalities 
to file for bankruptcy on their own initiative.12  Most states, including 
Michigan, require municipalities to obtain explicit authorization to file for 
bankruptcy.13  Only Georgia prohibits municipalities from filing for 
bankruptcy.14 
Second, a municipality is eligible to file for bankruptcy only if it is 
“insolvent.”15  Under the Bankruptcy Act, a private debtor is “insolvent” 
and eligible to file for bankruptcy if its debts exceed its assets.16  By 
contrast, a municipal debtor is “insolvent” only if it is: (1) “generally not 
paying its debts as they become due unless such debts are the subject of a 
bona fide dispute” or (2) “unable to pay its debts as they become due.”17  
Effectively, a municipality is “insolvent” and eligible to file for bankruptcy 
under Chapter 9 only if it cannot raise taxes or borrow in order to pay its 
debts.18  As a consequence, only the most financially distressed 
municipalities are eligible to file for bankruptcy. 
Third, a municipality is eligible for bankruptcy only if it “desires to 
effect a plan to adjust such debts.”19  In other words, unlike private debtors, 
municipalities must choose to file for bankruptcy, and cannot be forced into 
bankruptcy. 
And finally, a municipality is eligible for bankruptcy only if it: 
(A) has obtained the agreement of creditors holding at least a majority 
in amount of the claims of each class that such entity intends to impair 
under a plan in a case under such chapter . . . ; 
(B) has negotiated in good faith with creditors and has failed to obtain 
the agreement of creditors holding at least a majority in amount of the 
claims of each class that such entity intends to impair under a plan in a 
case under such chapter . . . ; 
 
 11.  11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2012). 
 12.  Those states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Idaho, Kentucky, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New York, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas and 
Washington. John Gramlich, Municipal Bankruptcy Explained: What it Means to File for 
Chapter 9, The Pew Charitable Trusts, November 22, 2011, 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2011/11/22/municipal-
bankruptcy-explained-what-it-means-to-file-for-chapter-9. 
 13.  See Mich. Comp. Laws § 141.1558 (2012). 
 14.  See Ga. Code Ann. § 36-80-5 (2010). 
 15.  11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(3) (2016). 
 16.  11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(A) and (B) (2016). 
 17.  11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(C) (2016). 
 18.  Se,e e.g., In re City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991). 
 19.  See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(4) (2016) and 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2016) (“An involuntary 
case may be commenced only under chapter 7 or 11 of this title, and only against a person, 
except a farmer, family farmer, or a corporation that is not a moneyed, business, or 
commercial corporation, that may be a debtor under the chapter under which such case is 
commenced.”). 
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(C) is unable to negotiate with creditors because such negotiation is 
impracticable; or 
(D) reasonably believes that a creditor may attempt to obtain a transfer 
that is avoidable under section 547 of this title. . . .20 
Essentially, in order to file for bankruptcy, a municipality must show 
that it has negotiated a plan of adjustment with the majority of its creditors, 
has tried and failed to negotiate a plan of adjustment, effectively cannot 
negotiate a plan of adjustment, or reasonably believes that a plan of 
adjustment will prevent inequitable treatment of its creditors. 
B. The Authority of the Bankruptcy Court Under Chapter 9 
The authority of a bankruptcy court hearing a municipal bankruptcy 
action under Chapter 9 is considerably more limited than under other 
chapters of the Bankruptcy Act.  Under other chapters of the Bankruptcy 
Act, the bankruptcy court can make certain financial decisions on behalf of 
the debtor during bankruptcy proceedings and can force the debtor to 
liquidate or accept a plan of reorganization.21  By contrast, under Chapter 
9, the bankruptcy court cannot make financial decisions on behalf of the 
municipal debtor and cannot force a municipal debtor to accept a plan of 
adjustment.22 
As a consequence, the formal powers of a bankruptcy court hearing a 
municipal bankruptcy action under Chapter 9 are essentially limited to: (1) 
determining whether the municipality is eligible to file for bankruptcy; (2) 
overseeing the handling of executory contracts, including collective 
bargaining agreements; and (3) approving or denying the municipality’s 
proposed plan of adjustment.23  But the court’s formal powers enable it to 
exert considerable informal power over the bankruptcy action.  The 
primary source of the court’s informal power derives from its formal power 
to approve or deny the municipality’s proposed plan of adjustment.  As a 
consequence, the court can exert informal power over the municipality by 
threatening to deny the plan of adjustment, and can exert informal power 
over the creditors by threatening to approve the plan of adjustment.  In 
practice, this informal power ideally enables the court to mediate disputes 
among the municipality and its creditors and to help them reach a 
settlement. 
 
 20.  See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(5) (2016). 
 21.  See 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2016) (Involuntary cases); 11 U.S.C. §§ 361-66 
(Administrative Powers). 
 22.  11 U.S.C. § 303 (2016) (Involuntary cases); 11 U.S.C. § 904 (Limitation on 
jurisdiction and powers of court). 
 23.  11 U.S.C. §§ 901-46 (2012). 
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C. The Rights of the Creditors Under Chapter 9 
The rights of the creditors in a municipal bankruptcy action under 
Chapter 9 are also considerably more limited than under other chapters of 
the Bankruptcy Act.  Under other chapters of the Bankruptcy Act, creditors 
may commence an involuntary bankruptcy action and may file a plan of 
reorganization.24  By contrast, under Chapter 9, creditors of a municipal 
debtor cannot commence an involuntary bankruptcy action and cannot file 
a plan of reorganization.25 
Chapter 9 protects creditors in several different ways.  First, it adopts 
the Chapter 11 requirement that at least one class of impaired creditors 
must accept the plan.26  And second, it adopts the Chapter 11 treatment of 
secured creditors, providing that they are entitled to receive at least the 
value of the property securing their claims.27  Under Chapter 9, this ensures 
that creditors with claims secured by particular revenue streams are entitled 
to the value of those revenue streams.  These provisions are intended to 
ensure that at least some impaired creditors have received fair treatment 
under the plan of adjustment, and that the municipality cannot collude with 
junior creditors to the detriment of senior creditors.28 
But Chapter 9 protects creditors primarily by requiring that the court 
determine that “the plan is in the best interests of creditors and is 
feasible.”29  Courts have typically held that a plan of adjustment is “in the 
best interest of creditors” if it provides creditors with the best recovery that 
they can reasonably expect under the circumstances, and that it is 
“feasible” if the municipal debtor can actually execute the plan.30  As a 
consequence, the court should approve a proposed plan of adjustment only 
if it provides a reasonable recovery to all of the creditors, depending on 
their respective circumstances, and the municipality can actually provide 
the recovery that it promises in the plan. 
This provision enables a bankruptcy court to exert pressure on both 
the municipality and the creditors to reach a settlement.  The court can 
 
 24.  See 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2016) (Involuntary cases); 11 U.S.C. §§ 361-66 
(Administrative Powers); 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (2000) (Who may file a plan). 
 25.  11 U.S.C. § 303 (2016) (Involuntary cases); 11 U.S.C. § 904 (Limitation on 
jurisdiction and powers of court); 11 U.S.C. § 941 (2012) (Filing of plan). 
 26.  11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (incorporating 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (2000)). 
 27.  11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (incorporating 11 U.S.C. § 506 (2012)). 
 28.  But see Stephen J. Lubben, The Overstated Absolute Priority Rule (Mar. 20, 
2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (arguing that there is not, cannot, and 
should not be an “absolute priority rule” in bankruptcy). 
 29.  11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7) (2012). See also Matthew Bruckner, The Virtue in 
Bankruptcy, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 233, 236 & nn.10-12 (2013). 
 30.  See, e.g., In re Corcoran Hosp. Dist., 233 B.R. 449, 454 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1999) 
(finding plan of adjustment “in the best interests of creditors” because obtaining additional 
tax revenue to support a hospital district was not possible) and Kane v. Johns-Manville 
Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 649 (2d Cir. 1988). 
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exert pressure on the municipality by threatening not to confirm its 
proposed plan of adjustment, and can exert pressure on the creditors by 
threatening to confirm the municipality’s proposed plan of adjustment.  But 
in practice, the court has more leverage over the creditors than the 
municipality, because it can force the creditors to accept a plan, but cannot 
force the municipality to adopt a plan.  And the social benefits of approving 
a plan that provides a suboptimal recovery to the creditors typically exceed 
the social costs.  As a consequence, while a bankruptcy court could 
theoretically refuse to approve a plan of adjustment that provided a 
suboptimal recovery to the creditors, in practice it provides an incentive for 
the court to approve a reasonable plan of adjustment, and enables 
municipal debtors to obtain bankruptcy protection on more favorable terms 
than non-municipal debtors.31  Moreover, the court must consider whether 
a plan that provides a suboptimal return to the creditors still provides a 
better return than the creditors could expect in case the plan was rejected. 
II. THE DETROIT BANKRUPTCY 
In April 2012, after decades of gradual economic decline, the City of 
Detroit faced an acute financial crisis, precipitated by former Mayor 
Kwame Kilpatrick’s decision to issue $1.4 billion in risky and possibly 
illegal pension obligation certificates-of-participation and corresponding 
interest rate swaps, which were secured by Detroit’s casino tax revenue.  
Mayor David Bing and the City Council entered a consent agreement with 
the State of Michigan to implement certain reforms in exchange for 
financial assistance.  When Detroit missed several deadlines and failed to 
meet certain benchmarks, the State of Michigan appointed an independent 
financial review team.  On February 19, 2013, the financial review team 
released its report, which found that Detroit faced a financial emergency it 
had “no satisfactory plan” to address.32 
Based on the report, Michigan took control of Detroit’s finances.  On 
March 14, 2013, Michigan Governor Rick Snyder declared a financial 
emergency.  On March 15, 2013, the Local Emergency Financial 
Assistance Loan Board appointed Kevyn Orr the Emergency Financial 
Manager of the City of Detroit, pursuant to Public Act 72 of 1990 of the 
State of Michigan, also known as the Local Government Fiscal 
Responsibility Act, and Orr took office on March 25, 2013.33  On March 
28, 2013, Public Act 72 was repealed by referendum, but it was quickly 
replaced by Public Act 436, which restored Orr’s authority.34 
 
 31.  In theory, this benefit is offset by the burden of obtaining permission to file for 
bankruptcy and the more stringent standard for showing insolvency under Chapter 9. 
 32.  DETROIT FINANCIAL REVIEW TEAM, REPORT OF THE DETROIT FINANCIAL REVIEW 
TEAM (Feb. 19, 2013). 
 33.  MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 141.1201-141.1291 (repealed 2013). 
 34.  MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 141.1542(e), 141.1571 (2013). 
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A. The Bankruptcy Court’s Initial Decisions 
On July 16, 2013, Orr recommended that Detroit file for municipal 
bankruptcy under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code.  And on July 18, 
2013, Governor Snyder authorized Detroit to file for bankruptcy, satisfying 
the first condition for a municipal bankruptcy action under Chapter 9, that a 
municipality be “specifically authorized” by the state to file for 
bankruptcy.35  Detroit immediately filed a Voluntary Petition for the City 
of Detroit, Michigan, commencing a municipal bankruptcy action.  At that 
point, Detroit had about $20 billion in outstanding debt, making its 
bankruptcy filing the largest municipal bankruptcy filing to date. 
Unsurprisingly, the bankruptcy court found that Detroit was 
“insolvent” and therefore qualified to be a debtor under Chapter 9 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, as its debts far exceeded its revenue and raising 
additional revenue was impossible.36  On August 2, 2013, the bankruptcy 
court required Detroit to file a plan of adjustment on or before March 1, 
2014.37  Between February 21, 2014 and August 20, 2014, Detroit filed 
seven proposed plans of adjustment.38  And on May 12, 2014, Detroit 
began soliciting formal acceptance of its final plan of adjustment by its 
various classes of creditors.  Ultimately, the overwhelming majority of 
Detroit’s creditors accepted the plan, including most of its impaired 
creditors. 
Detroit’s most substantial creditors were: 
• UBS and Bank of America Merrill Lynch, which owned the 
secured interest rate swaps; 
• The City’s pensioners, who were entitled to pension and 
medical benefits; and 
• Syncora and Financial Guaranty Insurance Company 
(“FGIC”), which owned hundreds of millions of dollars of 
unsecured debt. 
First, UBS and Bank of America Merrill Lynch settled with the 
Detroit for a fraction of the value of their secured claims, after the 
 
 35.  11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2016). 
 36.  See In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 190-91 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013). 
 37.  First Order Establishing Dates and Deadlines, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. 
Mich. Aug. 2, 2013) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 700. 
 38.  Plan for the Adjustment of Debts of the City of Detroit, In re City of Detroit, 504 
B.R. 97 (Feb. 21, 2014); Amended Plan for the Adjustment of Debts of the City of Detroit, 
In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97 (Mar. 31, 2014); Second Amended Plan for the 
Adjustment of Debts of the City of Detroit, In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, (Apr.16, 
2014); Third Amended Plan for the Adjustment of Debts of the City of Detroit, In re City of 
Detroit, 504 B.R. 97 (Apr. 25, 2014); Fourth Amended Plan for the Adjustment of Debts of 
the City of Detroit, In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97 (May 5, 2014;) Corrected Fifth 
Amended Plan for the Adjustment of Debts of the City of Detroit, In re City of Detroit, 504 
B.R. 97 (July 29, 2014); and Sixth Amended Plan for the Adjustment of Debts of the City of 
Detroit, In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97 (Aug. 20, 2014). 
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bankruptcy court repeatedly rejected Detroit’s proposed settlements on the 
ground that claims were based on debt that may have been illegally issued.  
Then, the pensioners settled with Detroit, after the DIA settlement enabled 
Detroit to offer them almost all of their pension benefits, and a small 
percentage of their medical benefits.  And finally, Syncora and FGIC 
settled with Detroit when they realized that the bankruptcy court would 
approve the final plan of adjustment with or without their consent.  
Ultimately, only a few creditors objected to Detroit’s final plan of 
adjustment.39 
B. The DIA Settlement 
The key to the resolution of the Detroit bankruptcy was the DIA 
settlement, which enabled Detroit to obtain the consent of its pensioners.  
Initially, when Detroit realized that it owned the DIA art and that the DIA 
art was worth billions of dollars, it considered selling the DIA art, in order 
to satisfy its creditors.  The DIA corporation vigorously opposed any sales, 
arguing that Detroit could not sell the DIA art, because it owned the DIA 
art subject to the public trust, a charitable trust, and various gift restrictions 
specific to particular works of art.  And on June 13, 2013, the Attorney 
General of Michigan issued an opinion stating that Detroit could not sell 
the DIA art, because it owned the DIA art subject to a charitable trust.40  
Essentially, the Attorney General opined that the Detroit Museum of Art 
(“DMA”) was formed as a charitable trust, that it conveyed its collection to 
Detroit subject to a charitable trust, and that Detroit therefore owned the 
DIA art subject to a charitable trust.41 
But Detroit’s principal creditors disagreed.  Detroit’s pensioners 
wanted to recover the full value of their pensions, even if it meant selling 
the DIA art.  And Syncora and FGIC made common cause with the 
pensioners, realizing that the DIA art was the most valuable asset owned by 
Detroit.  The DIA corporation was appalled by the prospect of Detroit 
selling any of the DIA art in order to pay its creditors, as were other art 
museums, professional organizations of art museums and museum 
directors, and charitable foundations affiliated with art museums.  But 
Detroit’s pensioners and creditors did not care, and considered the DIA art 
an asset like any other. 
In order to resolve the dispute, Detroit and the DIA corporation 
entered into mediation, supervised by Judge Gerald Rosen.  The primary 
purpose of the mediation was to reach an agreement between Detroit and 
the DIA corporation that would enable Detroit to form a settlement 
 
 39.  See generally NATHAN BOMEY, DETROIT RESURRECTED: TO BANKRUPTCY AND 
BACK (2016). 
 40.  Conveyance or Transfer of Detroit Institute of Arts Collection, Op. Att’y Gen. No. 
7272, available at http://www.ag.state.mi.us/opinion/datafiles/2010s/op10351.htm. 
 41.  Id. 
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agreement with its pensioners.  Judge Rosen observed that while Detroit’s 
aggregate obligation to its pensioners was enormous, the individual claims 
were relatively modest.  As a result, any reduction of the pension claims 
would impose serious hardships on individual pensioners. 
Judge Rosen’s solution was to ask the DIA corporation and a 
congeries of charitable foundations to effectively purchase the DIA art 
from Detroit for a fraction of its market value, but a sum sufficient to 
satisfy Detroit’s pensioners.  The settlement negotiated by Judge Rosen 
provided that the City would transfer the DIA art to the DIA corporation, in 
exchange for contributions of $816 million over twenty years from the DIA 
corporation and other charities and the State of Michigan.  Specifically, it 
provided that: 
• The DIA would secure and guarantee commitments for 
contributions to the General Retirement System and the Police 
and Fire Retirement System of $100 million over 20 years. 
• Various local and national charitable foundations, including 
the Ford, Kresge, and Knight foundations would contribute 
$366 million to the General Retirement System and Police and 
Fire Retirement System over 20 years. 
• The State of Michigan would contribute $350 million to the 
General Retirement System and Police and Fire Retirement 
System over 20 years. 
• The City would transfer the art to the DIA Corp., which will 
hold the art in a perpetual charitable trust for the benefit of the 
people of the City and the State.42 
The DIA settlement negotiated by Judge Rosen became known as the 
“Grand Bargain” because it enabled Detroit to satisfy both the DIA 
corporation and its pensioners.  Under the DIA settlement, the DIA 
corporation acquired all of the DIA art, in exchange for enough money to 
enable Detroit to pay its pensioners almost the full value of their claims.  
As a result, the DIA settlement enabled Detroit to both preserve the DIA 
collection in Detroit and settle with its pensioners, who might have been 
able to present confirmation of Detroit’s plan of adjustment if they were 
sufficiently dissatisfied with Detroit’s offer.  However, Detroit was not 
obligated to agree to the DIA settlement, and could have refused to sell the 
DIA art or sold the DIA art on the open market. 
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE DETROIT INSTITUTE OF ART 
The historical record shows that the city owned most or all of the DIA 
art outright, not subject to the public trust, a private charitable trust, or gift 
restrictions.  The public trust doctrine is irrelevant, as it does not and 
 
 42.  Oral Opinion on the Record, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Nov. 7, 
2014) (No. 13-53846). 
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should not apply to works of art.  Detroit did not own the DIA art subject to 
a charitable trust, as it purchased some of the DIA art from a charitable 
corporation via an unconditional bill of sale, purchased some of the DIA art 
with its own funds, and received some of the DIA art via unconditional 
gifts.  While Detroit received a few of the works of art in the DIA 
collection subject to limited gift restrictions, it owned the overwhelming 
majority of the DIA art outright.  Moreover, Detroit repeatedly and 
explicitly rejected efforts to impose trust and gift restrictions on its 
ownership of the DIA art. 
A. The Creation of the Detroit Museum of Art 
In 1881, James E. Scripps, the publisher of The Detroit News, 
embarked on a five-month European tour.  When he returned, The Detroit 
News published a series of columns in which Scripps described the art and 
culture of Italy, France, Germany, and the Netherlands.  The columns were 
popular, so Scripps revised and republished them as a book in 1882.43  In 
1883, William H. Brearley, the manager of The Detroit News advertising 
department, organized an art exhibit inspired by Scripps’s book, which was 
also popular. 
Based on the success of the book and exhibit, Scripps and Brearley 
decided to establish an art museum.  Scripps pledged to contribute $50,000 
to the museum, and asked forty prominent Detroit businessmen to 
contribute at least $1,000 each. 
On February 16, 1885, the Michigan Legislature passed “An act for 
the formation of corporations for the cultivation of art.”44  The 1885 Act 
authorized the formation of private, nonprofit corporations for the purpose 
of collecting and exhibiting works of art, with certain conditions: 
Such corporations shall have power to acquire and hold such real estate 
as is suitable for the site of such art buildings as it may erect or maintain 
thereon, to receive and use such gifts, contributions, devises, and 
bequests as may be made to it for art purposes; to receive, acquire, 
collect, and own paintings, sculpture, engravings, drawings, pictures, 
coins, and other works of art and to institute, maintain, or assist schools 
for the teaching of art. 
The public exhibition of its collection of works of art shall be the duty 
of every such corporation, and, as soon as it shall be prepared to do so, 
it shall, under reasonable regulations, and without any improper 
discriminations, open its building and art collections to the general 
public. 
. . . 
 
 43.  JAMES E. SCRIPPS, FIVE MONTHS ABROAD, OR, THE OBSERVATIONS AND 
EXPERIENCES OF AN EDITOR IN EUROPE (1882). 
 44.  1885 Mich. Pub. Acts 3. 
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All gifts, devises, or bequests made to any such corporation, and all its 
income, shall be faithfully used for the purposes for which the 
corporation was organized; and no dividend in money or property shall 
ever be made by such corporation among its members. 
The character and purposes of such corporation shall not be changed, 
nor its general art collection be sold, incumbered, or disposed of, unless 
authorized by the legislature of this state upon the concurrent request of 
said corporation, and of the mayor and board of aldermen of the city in 
which it is situated.  But if any such corporation should ever cease, be 
diverted from the lawful purposes of its organization, or become unable 
usefully to serve such purposes, the legislature may by law provide for 
the winding up of its affairs and for the conservation and disposition of 
the property in such way as may best promote and perpetuate, in the city 
where it is situated, the purposes for which such corporation was 
originally organized.45 
On April 16, 1885, the DMA was incorporated under the 1885 Act by 
40 members, each of whom contributed at least $1000.  Among other 
things, its articles of incorporation provided: 
Said corporation is formed for the objects and purposes contemplated 
by the act above mentioned, to wit, for the founding of a public art 
institute in the City of Detroit, which may acquire and hold such real 
estate as may be suitable for the site of such art buildings as it may erect 
or maintain thereon; receive and use such gifts, contributions, devises 
and bequests, as may be made it for art purposes; receive, acquire, 
collect and own paintings, sculpture, engravings, drawings, pictures, 
coins and other works of art, and may institute, maintain or assist 
schools for the teaching of art, and may do all other things authorized 
by said act, and have and enjoy all the privileges and franchises given 
thereby.46 
. . . 
The affairs of said corporation shall be managed by a board of trustees, 
the number of which shall be regulated by by-law, but in no case shall 
the number be less than four, nor more than sixteen.  Three-fourths of 
said trustees shall be elected by the members of the corporation, from 
their own number.  The other one-fourth of such trustees shall be 
appointed from resident free-holders, by the board of aldermen of the 
city where such corporation is situated, upon the nomination of the 
mayor.47 
 
 45.  1885 Mich. Pub. Acts 3, §§ 3-4, 15-16. 
 46.  Articles of Incorporation of the Detroit Museum of Art (1885). 
 47.  Id. 
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The DMA purchased a plot of land at 704 E. Jefferson Avenue, and 
built an art museum in the Richardsonian style, which opened to the public 
on September 1, 1888.  The founding collection of the DMA consisted of 
more than 70 works of art donated by Scripps. 
Initially, the DMA was privately funded.48  In 1893, the City of 
Detroit began providing funds from its contingent account to the DMA, in 
exchange for the museum not charging an admission fee.  In 1899, the 
Michigan Legislature amended the charter of the City of Detroit, 
empowering the Detroit Common Council to appropriate up to $20,000 per 
year for the DMA, and the Common Council exercised that power.49  In 
1903, the Michigan Legislature again amended the charter of the City of 
Detroit, empowering the Common Council to issue bonds to finance the 
construction of a new building for the DMA.50  In 1904, the Common 
Council authorized a $50,000 bond issue to help finance the construction of 
a new building for the DMA, which was approved by the Board of 
Estimates, and sustained by the Wayne County Circuit Court.51  The DMA 
used the money to build a lecture hall and classrooms. 
In November 1914, the DMA considered embarking on a significant 
construction project, but was concerned that it might not be eligible to 
receive public funding.  On November 27, 1914, the DMA Board of 
Directors decided to determine whether the DMA was legally eligible to 
receive public funding.  In 1915, the Board of Directors asked the 
Controller of the City of Detroit to withhold funds payable to the DMA, 
and filed an action to compel payment.  Ultimately, the Supreme Court of 
Michigan held that the act authorizing the Common Council to issue bonds 
to finance the construction of a building for the DMA violated the 
Michigan Constitution, which provided that “The credit of the state shall 
not be granted to, nor in aid of any person, association or corporation, 
public or private.”52 
 
 48.  REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, DETROIT MUSEUM OF ART REPORT FOR THE FISCAL 
YEAR JULY 1ST, 1917 TO JUNE 30, 1918 (1918). 
 49.  Loc. Acts 1899, No. 429. 
 50.  Loc. Acts 1903, No. 489, § 66 (“The common council shall also have power to 
appropriate from time to time such sums as is necessary for the purpose of erecting an 
additional building or buildings for the Detroit Museum of Art, which sums shall be paid 
from the general fund. The common council shall also have power, with the approval of the 
board of estimates, for the purpose of erecting such additional building or buildings for said 
museum of art to borrow upon the best terms it can make and for such time as it shall deem 
expedient, such sums of money as it shall deem necessary, not exceeding the sum of fifty 
thousand dollars, and shall have authority to issue bonds pledging the faith and credit of said 
city for the payment of the principal and interest of said bonds, which bonds shall be 
denominated ‘Detroit Museum of Art Bonds,’ of the city of Detroit and shall bear interest 
not exceeding four per cent. per annum.”). 
 51.  See Detroit Museum of Art v. Engel, 153 N.W. 700, 701 (Mich. 1915). 
 52.  MICH. CONST. art. 10, § 12. 
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In 1916, the City devised a method of providing public funds to the 
DMA that did not violate the constitutional prohibition on direct 
appropriations.  The City of Detroit Recreation Commission hired the 
DMA to operate the museum without charging admission, in exchange for 
$40,000 per year.53 However, the DMA soon found itself in financial 
distress.  On January 11, 1918, the DMA resolved to close its art school for 
lack of funds.54 
B. The Creation of the Detroit Institute of Art 
On June 25, 1918, the City of Detroit created an Arts Commission, 
consisting of four members, which was empowered to, inter alia, “build, 
operate and maintain suitable buildings to be used for the exhibition of 
paintings and works of art and auditorium purposes, to be known as the 
Detroit Institute of Arts, and to which, under proper rules and regulations, 
the public may have access free of charge”; “acquire, collect, own and 
exhibit, in the name of the city, works of art, books, and other objects such 
as are usually incorporated in Museums of Art”; “with the approval of the 
common council, in the name of the city, take and hold, by purchase, gift, 
devise, bequest or otherwise, such real and personal property as may be 
proper for carrying out the intents and purposes for which it is established”; 
and “with the approval of the council, sell and convey or lease any of the 
buildings or land under its control, whenever required by the interests of 
the city.”55 
In January 1919, the City appointed the initial members of the Arts 
Commission.56  On January 27, 1919, the Arts Commission submitted its 
first proposed budget to the Detroit Common Council.57  In March 1919, 
the Common Council approved an initial appropriation of $85,000, and in 
May 1919, it approved a final appropriation of $79,000, with $20,000 
earmarked for the purchase of artwork.58  The Arts Commission began to 
consider purchasing artwork in April 1919, and made its first recorded 
purchase on June 2, 1919, when it approved the purchase of two bronze 
sculptures for $1,800.59  Later that year, the Arts Commission also 
 
 53.  ANNUAL REPORT, DMA BULLETIN, at 9 (1916); DMA Minutes, Apr. 29, 1916. 
 54.  DMA Minutes, Jan. 11, 1918. 
 55.  CITY CHARTER, title IV, ch. XIX, §§ 1, 7 (June 25, 1918). 
 56.  REPORT OF THE ARTS COMM’N (1919); DIA BULLETIN, (Jan. 1920). 
 57.  Minutes of the Arts Comm’n of the City of Detroit, Mich., Jan. 27, 1919. 
 58.  Minutes of the Arts Comm’n of the City of Detroit, Mich., Mar. 3, 1919; Minutes 
of the Arts Comm’n of the City of Detroit, Mich., May 12, 1919. 
 59.  Minutes of the Arts Comm’n of the City of Detroit, Mich., Apr. 29, 1919 
(considering the purchase of a rug collection); Minutes of the Arts Comm’n of the City of 
Detroit, Mich., June 2, 1919. 
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purchased six oil paintings, four etchings, three carved wood panels, and 44 
textiles for the DIA collection.60 
On December 6, 1918, the members of the DMA authorized the 
trustees to convey its property, including its building and art collection, to 
the City.61  And on February 18, 1919, the trustees authorized the President 
and Treasurer “to execute and deliver to the City of Detroit a Deed of 
Conveyance of said real estate, the deed to be in such form and with such 
conditions as should to them appear sufficient to insure the use of said 
property for the purpose for which the Detroit Museum of Art was 
incorporated, or for some purpose kindred to such purpose.”62 
The President and Treasurer prepared a draft deed “which contained a 
provision for the reversion of the title to the Detroit Museum of Art upon 
the happening of either of the following conditions: (a) If the city should at 
any time use or permit the use of said premises, or any part thereof, for any 
other purpose than the one contemplated by Charter 19, Title 4, (IV), 
relating to an Arts Commission of the present charter of the City of Detroit; 
(b) If the city should fail within a given number of years to erect and 
complete on said premises a building costing a lot less than an agreed sum, 
suitable for the housing and exhibition of art, or (c) If the city should at any 
time fail to provide for and continue the proper care, maintenance and 
exhibition of the art collection then or thereafter belonging to the City of 
Detroit.”63 
The President and Treasurer presented the draft deed to a committee 
of the Detroit Common Council, which was “of the opinion that no Deed 
would be accepted except one without conditions.”64 
On June 28, 1918, the President of the DMA observed in his report to 
the members that the City of Detroit had appropriated $40,000 for the 
DMA for 1918, with the expectation that the DMA would convey its 
building and artwork to the City.  “Consistent with this financial 
encouragement, the city in its new charter has provided for an arts 
commission, contemplating that you will convey the property and trusts 
you hold to the city, as the basis for the Detroit Institute of Arts, as the new 
institution is to be named.  At a date to be set for the early fall you will 
probably be called together for the special purpose of acting upon the 
question of conveyance to the city, at which time your trustees will make 
such recommendations as may appear to them best.”65 
 
 60.  REPORT OF THE ARTS COMM’N (1919); DIA BULLETIN, (Jan. 1920). 
 61.  DMA Minutes, Jan. 27, 1920. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT (June 28, 1918); DETROIT MUSEUM OF ART, ANNUAL 
REPORT FOR THE YEAR 1918. 
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On April 15, 1919, the State of Michigan enacted Public Act 67, 
which amended the 1885 Act to provide: 
Any of the real estate of a corporation organized under this act may be 
used for any purpose which the circuit court in chancery, of the county 
in which said corporation is situated determines to be a purpose kindred 
to that for which the corporation is organized. 
Any corporation organized under this act situated in a city empowered 
to maintain a public art institute like or similar to that described in this 
act, may convey all or any of its property to said city upon such terms, 
in such manner and at such time or times as may be agreed upon by its 
trustees and the legislative body of said city; and said property so 
conveyed shall in the hands of said city be faithfully used for the 
purposes for which such corporation was organized: Provided, however, 
That any real estate so conveyed may be used for a kindred purpose as 
provided in section nineteen of this act. Said trustees are hereby 
empowered, in the event of their conveying to the city all of the 
property of said corporation, to wind up its affairs by taking appropriate 
proceedings in the circuit court in chancery, above mentioned.66 
On June 27, 1919, the President of the DMA informed the members of 
developments in the plan to transfer the DMA’s building and collection to 
the City of Detroit, noting that the City had rejected the DMA’s proposed 
conditions on the transfer: 
Beginning with the first of July, the Arts Commission of the City of 
Detroit takes in charge the city funds for the carrying out of its purposes 
and the building we now occupy has been placed in the hands of the 
Arts Commission by the city for its uses.  Carrying out your intention, 
as expressed at our last meeting called for the purpose, steps have been 
taken looking to the conveyance of our property and collections to the 
City of Detroit with due regard for the trust we hold and of the 
obligations attached thereto.  The state legislature has amended the act 
under which we incorporated which will become part of the law within 
the next 60 days, under which it becomes proper for us to much such 
conveyance to the municipality.  Under such conveyance the property 
can only be used for such purposes as we have received it or for some 
kindred purpose so indicated by the Circuit Court.  Final action on this 
matter cannot be taken at this meeting, but inasmuch as we shall be 
without funds for maintenance otherwise, your President suggests that if 
it appears to you to be in order, that a resolution be passed indicating 
the intention to make conveyance when the law permits and in the 
meantime to ask the Arts Commission to accept the responsibility of the 
operation and maintenance of the museum for us at the expense of the 
city. In considering the all-important move of conveyance to the city, 
 
 66.  1919 Mich. Pub. Acts 67, §§ 19-20 (1919). 
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permit me to mention at this time that during the past year your officers 
have given particular attention to the value that might be set upon our 
collections, real estate and other property, with the result that we 
believe that the collections may be conservatively valued at a million 
dollars and the new museum site on Woodward Avenue at over one 
million dollars.  Our invested endowments amount to $20,000. Cash on 
hand available for purchases is $9,460.95.  You have authorized your 
Board of Trustees to act upon this matter in accordance with their 
judgment, but opportunity for discussion will be given at this meeting.  
It was expected to make conveyance of the real estate at once as the 
required change in the law covered only the transfer of our collections.  
It was thought reasonable and in conformity with our obligation to ask 
the city to accept a deed to the real estate with a clause therein 
providing that the property should revert to this corporation if the city 
did not with a reasonable number of years erect thereon a suitable 
Museum building and properly maintain the collections later to be 
conveyed to it. This received the concurrence of Mr. Wm. C. Weber, in 
whose name some of our property stands. The form of deed was 
presented for consideration by the city council but the council expressed 
a unanimous opinion that it would be inexpedient to accept such a 
transfer with any reversionary clause or any other definitely expressed 
obligation.  If you should convey the real estate and the collections to 
the city in conformity with the amended legislation it should be noted 
that the property can be used only for such purposes as this permits, and 
further the conveyance would be made to the Arts Commission, who 
would hold the property in behalf of the city for its uses in accord with 
the provision of the city charter and the immediate intention of the city 
is definitely expressed in the appropriation for the ensuing year of 
$79,000.00 to cover maintenance and upkeep of the Detroit Institute of 
Arts, purchases for art collections and the sum of $3,000.00 to assist in 
the development of plans for a new museum building, which may 
clearly be taken as an earnest of intention.67 
The members of the DMA adopted a resolution authorizing the 
trustees “to execute and deliver a Deed of the real and personal property of 
the Association,” without conditions.68  On June 30, 1919, the DMA 
informed the City that it could no longer operate the museum, and offered 
to transfer its collection to the City.69  On July 1, 1919, the City accepted 
the collection and assumed the maintenance and operation costs of the 
museum pending formal conveyance.70 
 
 67.  REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT (June 27, 1919); DETROIT MUSEUM OF ART ANNUAL 
REPORT FOR THE YEAR 1919, at 11-12. 
 68.  DMA Minutes, Jan. 27, 1920. 
 69.  See Letter from DMA to Arts Comm’n, June 30, 1919. 
 70.  See Letter from Arts Comm’n to DMA, July 1, 1919. 
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On September 12, 1919, the trustees authorized the President and 
Treasurer to make the conveyance to the City.71  And in November 1919, 
the President and Treasurer “executed and delivered a Warranty Deed of 
the real estate and a Bill of Sale of the collection of Art, both running to the 
city of Detroit.”72  They delivered the deed and bill of sale to the Arts 
Commission, which presented them to the Common Council for approval.  
The Common Council accepted both and approved them by resolution over 
the Mayor’s veto.73  On December 16, 1919, the Common Council 
authorized the Controller to pay $35,863.22 for the DMA’s property.74  
And on December 29, the transaction was completed.75 
In 1920, the officers of the DMA made the following observation: 
You will recall that Act #67 of the Public Acts of the State of Michigan, 
approved April 15, 1919, under which authority was granted for the 
conveyance by Art Associations to the municipality of their property, 
contained a provision that the property so conveyed should in the hands 
of the city be faithfully used for the purpose for which the particular 
corporation was organized.  In the Deed to the City of Detroit it was 
expressly recited that the conveyance was executed and delivered under 
and in pursuance of said act.  This fact, together with the fact that the 
Deed was delivered to the Arts Commission, seemed to us sufficiently 
to give assurance that the property cannot be used excepting for the 
same purposes as were provided for in the incorporation of the Detroit 
Museum of Art, or some kindred purpose, as provided in the Act of the 
Legislature referred to.76 
Notably, the DMA did not dissolve, but rather adopted the following 
resolution: 
WHEREAS all of the property and collections of the Detroit Museum 
of Art, with the exceptions of its invested trust funds, have been 
conveyed and transferred to the City of Detroit to be administered by 
the newly created Arts Commission of the City of Detroit, and 
WHEREAS it is believed that the following enumerated objects can be 
obtained by the continuance of present corporation, i.e. 
a - To promote public interest in and appreciation of art in Detroit 
b - To co-operate in every way with the Detroit Institute of Arts, and to 
augment its collections from membership funds and contributions 
 
 71.  DMA Minutes, Jan. 27, 1920. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  DMA Minutes, Jan. 27, 1920 (It is unclear why the Mayor vetoed the decision of 
the Common Council). 
 74.  REPORT OF CONTROLLER (Dec. 16, 1919). 
 75.  Arts Comm’n Minutes, Dec. 29, 1919. 
 76.  DMA Minutes, Jan. 27, 1920. 
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c - To administer the funds and endowments now in the hands of the 
corporation and to encourage and receive in trust and to administer 
future gifts and legacies 
Now, therefore be it 
RESOLVED, that this corporation with its membership and funds be 
continued and also be it 
RESOLVED, that a committee of two be appointed by the President 
(himself acting as ex-officio member) for recommending of such 
changes and revisions as will best carry out the intentions herewith 
expressed.77 
On February 20, 1920, the DMA informed its members that the 
corporation would continue to exist under a new name, the “Detroit 
Museum of Arts Founders’ Society.”78  The purpose of the Founders’ 
Society was to assist the DIA “in every way,” and to use its endowment 
fund and other contributions in order to add to the DIA’s collection.79 
In January 1920, the Arts Commission requested an additional 
appropriation of funds from the City to purchase artwork, on the ground 
that it was a capital investment, not an expense. 
Because of their precious quality, art objects of suitable character for a 
public collection require a large capital outlay.  This appropriation, 
however, is not an expense.  The accessions purchased with it are a 
continuing asset which constantly fulfills a sphere of usefulness in the 
lives of the people, and at the same time these objects increase in 
intrinsic worth each year.80 
The City agreed and provided an additional appropriation of $50,000, 
which the Arts Commission used to purchase 27 paintings, 15 sculptures, 
50 etchings, 15 woodcuts, and 36 other works.81  Throughout the 1920s, the 
Arts Commission added many works to the DIA collection, including 
purchases, gifts, and bequests.  The City also began construction of a new 
DIA building on Woodward Avenue.  And, in 1927, the DIA moved from 
its original building on Jefferson Avenue to its current home on Woodward 
Avenue. 
In the 1930s, the Common Council reduced the Arts Commission’s 
appropriation, forcing it to lay off the DIA’s curatorial staff and consider 
closing the DIA.82  However, the Mayor vetoed the Common Council’s 
 
 77.  DMA Minutes, Jan. 27, 1920. 
 78.  DMA Minutes, Feb. 20, 1920. 
 79.  1920 DMA REPORT. 
 80.  REPORT OF THE ARTS COMM’N, 1919; DIA Bulletin, Jan., 1920. 
 81.  REPORT OF THE ARTS COMM’N (1920). 
 82.  Letter from the Arts Comm’n to the Common Council, Jan. 1, 1932. 
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action and increased the Arts Commission’s appropriation, enabling it to 
keep the DIA open.83 
On January 29, 1962, the Detroit Museum of Arts Founders’ Society 
changed its name to “Founders Society Detroit Institute of Arts.”84  In 
1962, the trustees of the DIA hired a new director, Willis Woods, who 
secured public and private funding to expand the building.  In 1966, the 
DIA opened its South Wing, and in 1971, it opened its North Wing.  
Woods also expanded the DIA’s collection, primarily through large 
bequests.  City funding for the DIA also increased between 1964 and 1974, 
from $630,000 to $2,240,000. 
However, in 1974, the City drastically reduced the DIA’s 
appropriation, cutting $786,000 to $1,792,000.  The DIA Director chose to 
terminate the museum guards, forcing the DIA to temporarily close to the 
public.85  While the DIA attempted to pursue state funding, city funding 
continued to decrease.  In 1976, the City decreased the DIA appropriation 
from $1,792,000 to $47,000. Luckily, state funding offset the decrease in 
City funding, and the DIA’s budget remained stable.  In 1977, the DIA’s 
budget increased to $1,800,000, in addition to a $1,000,000 art acquisition 
budget. 
On September 30, 1992, the Founders Society Detroit Institute of Arts 
changed its name to “The Detroit Institute of Arts Founders Society.”86  
And on October 11, 2000, it changed its name to “The Detroit Institute of 
Arts.”87 
In the 1990s and 2000s state appropriations for the DIA gradually 
began to decrease.  And in 2010, the State reduced its DIA appropriation to 
a token $20,000.  In response to this financial crisis, the DIA laid off 20% 
of its employees, and began a lobbying campaign to secure a tax millage to 
fund the DIA.  On August 7, 2010, Oakland County, Macomb County, and 
Wayne County voted to approve the tax millage, which provides about $23 
million in annual funding for the DIA, in exchange for the DIA providing 
free admission to the residents of those counties. 
IV. THE BANKRUPTCY COURT’S OPINIONS 
On November 7, 2014, the bankruptcy court issued an oral opinion 
confirming the City of Detroit’s plan of adjustment, and approving the 
settlements incorporated into that plan of adjustment, including the DIA 
 
 83.  Arts Comm’n Public Statement, 1932. 
 84.  See Certificate of Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation, filed Jan. 29, 1962. 
 85.  Arts Comm’n Minutes, Jun. 6, 1975. 
 86.  Certificate of Assumed Name, filed Sept. 30, 1992. 
 87.  Certificate of Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation, Oct. 11, 2000. 
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settlement.88  And on December 31, 2014, the bankruptcy court issued a 
written opinion expanding on its written opinion.89 
A. The Bankruptcy Court’s Oral Opinion 
On November 7, 2014, the bankruptcy court issued an oral opinion 
confirming the City of Detroit’s plan of adjustment, and approving the 
settlements incorporated into that plan of adjustment, concluding that they 
were “reasonable, fair and equitable.”90  Specifically, the bankruptcy court 
found that the DIA settlement was both fair and in the best interest of the 
creditors. 
1. Fairness to the Creditors 
In its oral opinion, the bankruptcy court concluded that the DIA 
settlement was fair to the creditors because the City held the DIA art 
subject to both a trust and specific transfer restrictions that prohibited its 
sale.  The court also observed that litigation would be lengthy and costly, 
and that any attempt to sell the DIA might result in a cancellation of the 
millage taxes that provided the majority of the DIA budget: 
Addressing the fairness of the settlement, the Court will first examine 
the relative strengths of the parties’ positions.  Both the Michigan 
Attorney General and the DIA itself take the position that the DIA art is 
subject to a trust that prohibits the City from selling it to pay debts and 
places it beyond the creditors’ reach.  The DIA also asserts that the 
donors of many of the pieces of art had imposed specific transfer 
restrictions on them. 
The evidence supports these assertions.  The Court was especially 
impressed with the testimony of Ms. Erickson on these points, and with 
the historical documentary evidence that the DIA cited in its brief and 
that was admitted in evidence. 
The evidence further establishes that nationally accepted standards for 
museums prohibit the de-acquisition of art to pay debt.  The creditors 
also admitted, perhaps grudgingly, that no creditor had ever considered 
the value of the art as a possible source of repayment when it decided to 
lend money to the City or to acquire City debt. 
On the other hand, the creditors did submit substantial evidence and 
legal grounds supporting the contrary view that the City can legally sell 
or monetize the DIA art. 
 
 88.  Oral Opinion on the Record, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014) (No. 
13-53846). 
 89.  In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014). 
 90.  Oral Opinion on the Record, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014) (No. 
13-53846). 
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On balance, the Court concludes that in any potential litigation 
concerning the City’s right to sell the DIA art, or concerning the 
creditors’ right to access the art to satisfy its claims, the position of the 
Attorney General and the DIA almost certainly would prevail. 
However, evidence also established that any such result in litigation 
might well have taken years to achieve and would have been costly to 
pursue.  It also would have been difficult for the City to endure the 
delay and expense while at the same time attempting to revitalize itself.  
The DIA and the attorney general state with credibility that they would 
vigorously contest any attempt to sell any art. Credible evidence also 
establishes that an attempt by the City to sell its art might result in a 
cancellation of the county millage taxes that support the DIA’s 
operations and constitute almost 70% of the DIA’s budget. 
The Court concludes that the DIA settlement was a most reasonable and 
favorable settlement for the City and its pension creditors.  The Court 
readily approves it.  Accordingly, the Court approves all aspects of the 
grand bargain.91 
Essentially, the bankruptcy court held that the DIA settlement was fair 
because Detroit could not sell the DIA art, which it owned subject to an 
unspecified “trust,” as well as gift restrictions specific to particular works 
of art.  The court also recognized that “nationally accepted standards for 
museums prohibit the de-acquisition of art to pay debt,” but did not 
explicitly rely on those rules in reaching its conclusion.  And the court 
noted that the creditors had not relied on the DIA as collateral.  Finally the 
court observed that litigating Detroit’s right to sell the DIA art would be 
costly and potentially harmful to the DIA. 
2. The Best Interests of the Creditors 
The bankruptcy court also held that the DIA settlement was in the best 
interests of the creditors, primarily because Detroit refused to sell the DIA 
art: 
Section 943(b)(7) requires that the plan be in the best interests of 
creditors.  The cases generally hold that in chapter 9, this means that the 
creditors will receive all that they can reasonably expect under the 
circumstances.  The only legal alternative to plan confirmation is 
dismissal, because no other party can file a plan of adjustment and the 
liquidation of a municipality’s assets is not permitted in chapter 9.  
Accordingly, the Court will also consider whether the plan is a better 
alternative for creditors than dismissal. 
 
 91.  Id. at 12-13. 
FRYE.FORMATTED 11/22/2016  8:09 PM 
652 UNIVERSITY OF DETROIT MERCY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:629 
Under the plain language of section 943(b)(7), the issue is the best 
interests of creditors as a whole, not any particular creditor or class of 
creditors. 
The Court finds that the plan is in the best interests of creditors. 
Some creditors have argued that the City could pay more to creditors by 
raising taxes and by monetizing assets, specifically the art at the DIA. 
No provision of law allows the creditors to access the DIA art to satisfy 
their claims, whether in bankruptcy or outside of bankruptcy.  The 
market value of the art, therefore, is irrelevant in this case.  A judgment 
creditor’s sole remedy is a court-ordered property tax assessment 
process under Michigan’s Revised Judicature Act.  Michigan law 
prohibits execution on municipal property. 
Some creditors argue that the best interest test in chapter 9 requires this 
Court’s full consideration of all of the City’s assets, including the art, 
even if the assets would not be accessible to unsecured creditors outside 
of bankruptcy. 
The Court also rejects the argument.  The legal limitations on the 
collection of judgments that apply outside of bankruptcy also constrain 
the best interests of creditors test in bankruptcy.  Neither the bankruptcy 
code nor the case law suggests otherwise. 
As noted, the City determined not to sell or monetize the DIA art in the 
art market. Under section 904, that decision is off-limits to this Court.92 
Essentially, the court found that confirmation of the plan was in the 
best interests of the creditors, because the only alternative was dismissal of 
the plan, which would be worse for the creditors than confirmation.  The 
creditors asked the court to refuse to confirm the plan unless Detroit agreed 
to sell some or all of the DIA art.  The court effectively responded that 
Detroit had refused to sell any of the DIA art, that the court could not force 
Detroit to sell the DIA art, and that the DIA art was therefore not available 
to the creditors as a remedy for their claims.  In other words, the court 
found that the DIA settlement was in the best interests of the creditors 
because it was the best deal they could get. 
But the court also observed that the continued existence of the DIA 
was important to the future and economic recovery of Detroit: 
However, even if the law did give the Court some authority here, the 
Court would not have interfered with the City’s decision.  The City 
made the only appropriate decision.  Maintaining the art at the DIA is 
critical to the feasibility of the City’s plan of adjustment and to the 
City’s future.  The Court toured parts of the DIA and saw the art there, 
as well as how its many visitors were experiencing the art.  It also 
 
 92.  Id. at 22-23 
FRYE.FORMATTED 11/22/2016  8:09 PM 
Fall 2016] Art & the “Public Trust” in Municipal Bankruptcy 653 
accepts the testimony of Ms. Erickson on the priceless value that the 
DIA and the art creates for the City, the region and the state. 
The evidence unequivocally establishes that the DIA stands at the center 
of the City as an invaluable beacon of culture, education for both 
children and adults, personal journey, creative outlet, family experience, 
worldwide visitor attraction, civic pride and energy, neighborhood and 
community cohesion, regional cooperation, social service, and 
economic development.  Every great City in the world actively pursues 
these values.  They are the values that Detroit must pursue to uplift, 
inspire and enrich its residents and its visitors.  They are also the values 
that Detroit must pursue to compete in the national and global economy 
to attract new residents, visitors and businesses.  To sell the DIA art 
would only deepen Detroit’s fiscal, economic and social problems.  To 
sell the DIA art would be to forfeit Detroit’s future.  The City made the 
right decision. 
The City also rejected the concept of using the art as a collateral for a 
loan to pay creditors, for two reasons.  First, that proposal would just 
substitute debt for debt and would not help the City.  Second, if the City 
defaulted, it might lose the art.  The City made the right decision here 
too. 
Beyond that, the record reflects that the City has made reasonable 
efforts to monetize other assets, including the Detroit Windsor Tunnel, 
certain real estate properties, certain parking properties, the Joe Louis 
arena property and certain other property that it no longer needs.  It also 
entered into the Great Lakes Water Authority memorandum of 
understanding with Wayne, Oakland and Macomb Counties, which 
benefits all creditors.  The Court finds that the City has made reasonable 
efforts to monetize its assets to satisfy the best interests of creditors test. 
The evidence also establishes that raising taxes is not a viable option for 
the City.  In the eligibility opinion, the Court found that the City cannot 
legally increase its tax rates.  Mayor Duggan testified that the likelihood 
of the people of Detroit or the state legislature voting to raise taxes is 
remote. 
Further, a property tax increase would produce very little additional 
revenue.  The Mayor testified that taxes in Detroit are among the 
highest relative to surrounding communities and the city services are 
comparatively low.  Kevyn Orr credibly testified that the City is at tax 
saturation and raising taxes would likely add to the population decline. 
The evidence also establishes that the plan is a better, indeed much 
better, alternative for creditors than dismissal.  Significant City 
obligations would become immediately due.  As mentioned earlier, in 
that scenario, the creditors’ only remedy is the property tax assessment 
remedy under the Revised Judicature Act.  It is easy to foresee that a 
great number of creditors would race for that relief and the result would 
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be chaos and an administrative nightmare for all involved.  The City’s 
reinvestment and revitalization initiatives would stall.  The pension 
UAAL and OPEB claims in the billions of dollars would go unresolved. 
There is no more money available for creditors in the City’s already 
tight budget projections.  The Court’s feasibility expert so testified, as 
the Court will review here shortly.  Every dollar is accounted for in 
providing necessary services, in implementing the City’s necessary 
RRIs, and in repaying plan obligations.  All of those cash uses are 
essential to the City’s future. 
Accordingly, the Court finds that the plan will provide creditors all that 
they can reasonably expect under the circumstances and that it is in their 
best interests.93 
In other words, the court recognized that the purpose of municipal 
bankruptcy is not liquidation but reorganization.  Municipal bankruptcy is 
intended to enable a distressed municipal debtor to discharge its debts and 
resume operations, while providing a reasonable and fairly distributed 
recovery to its creditors.  As a consequence, municipal bankruptcy does not 
require a city to liquidate municipal assets that are necessary to the future 
viability of the municipality, and the court took an expansive view of such 
assets to include the DIA. 
B. The Bankruptcy Court’s Written Opinion 
On December 31, 2014, the bankruptcy court issued a written opinion 
confirming the City of Detroit’s plan of adjustment.94  In its written 
opinion, the court affirmed its holding that the DIA settlement was fair and 
in the best interests of the creditors.  The written opinion also expanded on 
the oral opinion, primarily by providing additional reasoning. 
1. Fairness to the Creditors 
In its written opinion, the bankruptcy court reiterated and expanded 
upon its holding that the DIA settlement was fair because Detroit could not 
and should not sell the DIA art.  The court recognized the Michigan 
Attorney General’s and the DIA corporation’s claims that “all of the art at 
the DIA is held in charitable trust for the benefit of the people of the State 
and so it cannot be sold to pay the City’s debts.”95  The court also 
recognized the DIA corporation’s claim that “the donors of many of the 
pieces of art imposed specific transfer restrictions on them.”96  The court 
recognized that “the Attorney General, the DIA itself and even many of its 
individual donors would vigorously challenge any attempt by the City to 
 
 93.  Id. at 23-25. 
 94.  In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014). 
 95.  Id. at 177. 
 96.  Id. 
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sell any of the art.”97  And the court observed that “[a]ny sale could result 
in the cancellation of the tri-county millage taxes that support almost 70% 
of the DIA’s operating budget.”98 
The court found that the DIA “presented credible historical 
documentary evidence in support of its position that the City holds the art 
in trust.”99  The court identified three bases for the DIA’s argument that 
Detroit held the DIA art in trust. 
First, the court observed that “Public Act 67 of 1919, which provided 
for the transfer of the DIA real property and its art from the Detroit 
Museum of Art (the predecessor to the DIA) to the City, required that the 
‘property so conveyed shall in the hands of said city be faithfully used for 
the purposes for which the [Detroit Museum of Art] was organized.’”100  
And the court recognized that the trustees of the DMA “believed the 
restrictions in PA 67 of 1919 ‘give assurance that the property cannot be 
used excepting for the same purposes as were provided for in the 
incorporation of the Detroit Museum of Art.’”101 
Second, the court observed that the May 15, 1984 Operating 
Agreement between Detroit and the Founders Society “state that the City 
‘has maintained and operated the DIA for over 60 years for the benefit of 
the citizens of the City and the State of Michigan’” and that “the City 
would use state-allocated funds solely for the DIA, which was consistent 
with ‘the goal of continuing to benefit the citizens of the City and the State 
by preserving for their enjoyment the treasures of the DIA[.]’”102 
Third, the court observed that “the DIA’s current Collection 
Management Policy states that ‘the [DIA] must be ever aware of its role as 
trustee of the collection for the benefit of the public’” and that “the façade 
of the DIA itself, built by the City in 1927, states that it is ‘Dedicated by 
the People of Detroit to the Knowledge and Enjoyment of Art.’”103 
The court concluded that these historical facts provided “strong 
evidence that the DIA was founded for the benefit of the residents of the 
City and the State, that the City believed that this was the case when the 
City received title to the art in 1919, and that the City has treated the DIA 
as a public trust for over one hundred years.”104 
The court also observed that “nationally accepted standards for 
museums prohibit the de-acquisition of art to pay debt.”105  Specifically, the 
 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 177. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. at 178. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. 
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court recognized that the standards of the Association of Art Museum 
Directors (the “AAMD”) only permit museums to sell works of art in order 
to purchase new works of art, and prohibit museums from selling works of 
art for any other purpose, including to pay operating expenses, which 
would include city debt.  As a consequence, the court recognized that “if 
the City sold any of its art to pay its debts, the national and international art 
community would refuse to do business with the DIA.”106 
Finally, the court observed that selling some or all of the DIA art 
could “flood the art market” and lower prices.  “Consequently, there is no 
guaranty that the City would achieve the high returns that many creditors 
asserted.”107 
The court acknowledged that “the creditors did submit substantial 
evidence and legal grounds to support the contrary view that the City can 
legally sell or monetize the DIA art.”108  Specifically, the court observed 
that “the current DIA Operating Agreement states that ‘[t]he City shall 
retain title to and ownership of the (a) City art collection and (b) the DIA 
properties.’”109 
But the court concluded that “in any potential litigation concerning the 
City’s right to sell the DIA art, or concerning the creditors’ right to access 
the art to satisfy their claims, the position of the Attorney General and the 
DIA would almost certainly prevail.”110  Notably, the court did not explain 
why it reached that conclusion.  But it also observed that “any such 
litigation would take years to conclude and would be costly to pursue” and 
that “[i]t . . . would be difficult for the City to endure that delay and 
expense while at the same time attempting to revitalize itself.”111 
2. The Best Interests of the Creditors 
The court also concluded that the DIA settlement was in the best 
interests of the creditors under Section 943(b)(7) of the Bankruptcy Act, 
because it provided “‘a better alternative for creditors than what they 
already have.’”112  The court observed that under Chapter 9, the only 
options are confirmation or dismissal of the municipality’s plan of 
adjustment, so the question is “whether the available state law remedies 
could result in a greater recovery for the City’s creditors than confirmation 
of the plan.”113  The court concluded that they could not, and “that losing 
 
 106.  In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 178. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 110.  Id. at 179. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 213 (quoting In re Pierce Cty. Hous. Auth., 414 
B.R. 702, 718 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2009)). 
 113.  Id. 
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the benefits of the plan will actually impair creditors’ recoveries under 
these state law remedies.”114 
Specifically, the court held that the DIA settlement was in the best 
interests of the creditors because “no provision of law allows the creditors 
to access City assets, most importantly including the DIA art, to satisfy 
their claims.  The market value of the City’s assets, including its art is, 
therefore, irrelevant in this case.”115  Certain creditors argued that the court 
should consider the market value of Detroit’s assets in determining whether 
the plan was in the best interests of the creditors.  But the court disagreed, 
concluding that “[t]he legal limitations on the collection of judgments that 
apply outside of bankruptcy also constrain the best interests of creditors test 
in bankruptcy.”116  As the court explained, “the City determined not to sell 
or monetize the DIA art in the art market.  Under § 904, that decision is 
off-limits to the Court.”117 
The court further observed that even if Detroit could sell the DIA art, 
it should not do so. 
However, even if the law did give the Court some authority here, the 
Court would not have interfered with the City’s decision.  The City 
made the only appropriate decision.  Maintaining the art at the DIA is 
critical to the feasibility of the City’s plan and to the City’s future. . . . 
To sell the DIA art would only deepen Detroit’s fiscal, economic and 
social problems.  To sell the DIA art would be to forfeit Detroit’s 
future.  The City made the right decision.118 
Ultimately, the court concluded that the DIA settlement and the plan 
of adjustment as a whole were in the best interests of the creditors because 
they provided the creditors with as much as they could reasonably expect to 
receive.  “The Court finds that the City has made reasonable efforts to 
monetize its assets to satisfy the best interests of creditors test.”119 
V. ANALYSIS OF THE BANKRUPTCY COURT’S OPINIONS 
The bankruptcy court’s oral and written opinions with respect to the 
DIA settlement were broadly similar.  In both, the bankruptcy court found 
that the DIA settlement was fair to the creditors because Detroit could not 
sell the DIA art, and found that the DIA settlement was in the best interests 
of the creditors because Detroit would not and should not sell the DIA art.  
The primary difference between the two is that the written opinion 
elaborated on the court’s reasons for concluding that Detroit could not sell 
 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. at 218. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 218. 
 119.  Id. at 219. 
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the DIA art, and that Detroit’s unwillingness to sell the DIA art was both 
dispositive and correct. 
However, the court’s conclusions as to why the DIA settlement was 
both fair to the creditors and in the best interests of the creditors are 
mutually contradictory.  If Detroit could not sell the DIA art, its refusal to 
sell the DIA art was irrelevant to the best interests of the creditors.  So why 
did the court rely on Detroit’s refusal to sell the DIA art to conclude that 
the DIA settlement was in the best interests of the creditors? 
The inescapable answer is that the court’s stated conclusion that 
Detroit could not sell the DIA art was incorrect, and the court surely knew 
that it was incorrect.  Detroit owned the DIA art outright, not subject to the 
“public trust” or a charitable trust, and few if any of the works of art in the 
DIA collection were affected by private gift restrictions.  Moreover, not 
only could Detroit sell the DIA art, it did in fact sell the DIA art.  The DIA 
settlement itself specifically provided that Detroit would sell the DIA art to 
the DIA corporation, in exchange for contributions of $816 million over 
twenty years from the DIA corporation and other charitable foundations 
and the State of Michigan. 
However, the court’s conclusion that the DIA settlement was fair to 
the creditors was still correct, even though Detroit could sell the DIA art, 
because the court could not force the City to sell the DIA art, and the 
creditors were not entitled to collect on the DIA art.  Accordingly, the DIA 
settlement was fair, not only because the plan of adjustment fairly 
distributed Detroit’s available assets among its different classes of 
creditors, but also because the DIA settlement actually resulted in Detroit 
selling the DIA art and distributing the assets generated by the sale to the 
creditors.  While Detroit was not obligated to sell the DIA art, it chose to 
do so anyway, resulting in a plan of confirmation that was arguably more 
generous to the creditors than they were entitled.  As a consequence, the 
DIA settlement was clearly in the best interests of the creditors, as it 
increased the amount of their recovery.  Moreover, the DIA settlement was 
instrumental in convincing Detroit’s pensioners, its most politically potent 
and vulnerable class of creditors, to consent to the final plan of adjustment. 
A. Fairness to the Creditors 
In both its oral opinion and its written opinion, the bankruptcy court 
concluded that the DIA settlement was fair to the creditors because the City 
could not sell the DIA art.  While the court did not specify why it 
concluded that the City could not sell the DIA art, it recognized three 
possible reasons: 1) the City owned the DIA subject to the “public trust” or 
a charitable trust; 2) professional rules governing museums prohibit them 
from deaccessioning works in order to pay debt; and 3) the sale of the DIA 
art would not generate as much revenue as projected.  On examination, 
none of these are convincing. 
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1. The City Did Not Own the DIA Art Subject to the “Public Trust” or a 
Charitable Trust 
First, the bankruptcy court observed that the Michigan Attorney 
General and the DIA argued that the City owned the DIA art subject to the 
“public trust” or a charitable.  The law supports neither of these claims.  
The City did not and could not own the DIA subject to the “public trust” 
because the “public trust” doctrine only applies to natural resources like 
navigable waters and parks, and does not apply to chattel property like 
works of art. 
a. The “Public Trust” Doctrine 
The “public trust” doctrine grew out of Roman and English law, both 
of which provided that certain rights to use navigable waters were 
irrevocably dedicated to the public, and could not be alienated by the 
sovereign, with certain qualifications.120  United States law incorporated 
the public trust doctrine, providing that the federal and state governments 
held the navigable waters of the United States “in trusteeship” for the 
public.121  As Joseph Sax explained in his history of the “public trust” 
doctrine, “American law courts held it ‘inconceivable’ that any person 
should claim a private property interest in the navigable waters of the 
United States.”122 
However, under United States law, the public trust doctrine does not 
prohibit all conveyances of navigable waters, only those which are 
inconsistent with the government’s obligation to exercise its police 
powers.123  Accordingly, under the “public trust” doctrine, a person can 
claim a private property interest in a section of the shoreline, but cannot 
claim a private property interest in the majority of the waterfront of the 
City of Chicago.124  The former may be consistent with the public interest, 
but the latter cannot. 
Eventually, United States courts arguably extended the public trust 
doctrine to include certain lands dedicated to public use as parks, in a 
limited fashion.125  While some scholars have argued that the public trust 
doctrine should be interpreted expansively to include any property owned 
by a public or charitable entity, it currently applies only to real property 
dedicated to a public use.  No state has applied the public trust doctrine to 
 
 120.  See generally Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: 
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970); see also Carol M. Rose, 
Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 ECOL. L.Q. 351 (1998). 
 121.  See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894). 
 122.  Sax, supra note 121, at 484. 
 123.  See Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
 124.  See id. 
 125.  See Sax, supra note 121, at 556. 
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chattel property, and more specifically, no state has applied the public trust 
doctrine to works of art. 
And quite rightly.  The purpose of the public trust doctrine is to 
protect the sovereign authority of government bodies by prohibiting them 
from conveying private property rights that would prevent them from 
exercising their sovereign authority.126  The sale of chattel property does 
not and cannot prevent a government body from exercising its sovereign 
authority.  While it is perfectly reasonable to argue that a government body 
should not sell works of art, it is nonsensical to argue that selling works of 
art would prevent a government body from exercising its sovereign 
authority.  In fact, the opposite could easily be the case.  For example, 
under the DIA settlement, Detroit sold the DIA art in order to enable itself 
to exercise its sovereign authority and satisfy the legitimate demands of its 
pensioners. 
b. The DIA Art & the “Public Trust” 
While the DIA corporation argued that the City owned the DIA art 
subject to the “public trust,” its argument on that point was desultory at 
best.  The DIA correctly observed that the “public trust” doctrine provides 
that “governmental entities have a duty to preserve and protect resources 
held in trust for the public” and that Michigan recognizes the doctrine.127  
But it conceded that no Michigan court has ever found that the “public 
trust” doctrine applies to “cultural property” like a museum collection, and 
merely argued that the court should extend the doctrine and apply it to 
museums.128 
The Michigan Attorney General also grudgingly conceded that the 
“public trust” doctrine only applies to natural resources, and does not apply 
to museum collections.  “The term ‘public trust’ as used by museums and 
their associations should not be equated with the ‘public trust doctrine’ that 
Michigan and other courts have applied to navigable waterways.”129 
In sum, the claim that the City owned the DIA art subject to the 
“public trust” was entirely unfounded and not taken seriously by the parties 
or the court.  Moreover, it makes no sense to apply the “public trust” 
 
 126.  But see, e.g., Jennifer Anglim Kreder, The “Public Trust”, 18 U. PA. J. CON. L. 
(forthcoming 2016) (arguing that the “public trust” doctrine should be construed in light of 
the term “public Trust” in the No Religious Test clause of Art. VI of the Constitution, and 
may prevent museums from selling art works under certain circumstances). 
 127.  See Illinois Central R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 452; see also Glass v. Goeckel, 703 
N.W.2d 58, 65 (Mich. 2005). 
 128.  Response of the Detroit Institute of Arts to Objections to the City’s Amended Plan 
of Confirmation at 19, In re City of Detroit, Mich., 524 B.R. 147 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014). 
 129.  Conveyance or Transfer of DIA Collection, Mich. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 7272, at 10 
n.8 (2013) (citing Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58 (Mich. 2005); Netweg v. Wallace, 208 
N.W. 51 (Mich. 1926); State v. Venice of America Land Co., 125 N.W. 770 (Mich. 1910)), 
available at http://media.mlive.com/news/detroit_impact/other/AGO%207272.pdf. 
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doctrine to chattel property like works of art.  As Donn Zaretsky has 
trenchantly observed, “it is not at all inconceivable that any person should 
claim a private property in [works of art].  It is in fact quite conceivable: 
most works of art are privately owned.”130  Indeed, most art museums are 
nonprofit corporations that privately own works of art which they may 
freely sell.  If anything, the DIA art was the exception to the rule, given 
that it actually was owned by a public entity, the City of Detroit.  But it was 
owned by the City like any other chattel property, which the City could and 
did freely sell. 
c. The DIA Art & Charitable Trust Law 
The Attorney General and the DIA also argued that Detroit could not 
sell the DIA art because it owned the DIA art subject to a charitable trust.  
And the bankruptcy court apparently agreed, finding that the DIA 
“presented credible historical documentary evidence in support of its 
position that the City holds the art in trust.”131  But it was incorrect.  The 
evidence presented by the Attorney General and the DIA corporation did 
not support a finding that Detroit owned the DIA art subject to a charitable 
trust. 
First, the Attorney General and the DIA claimed that the 1885 Articles 
of Incorporation of the DMA established a charitable trust.132  That is 
plainly incorrect. The DMA was formed as a charitable corporation, not a 
charitable trust.133  Moreover, in 1885, Michigan law did not even 
recognize charitable trusts.134  So if the DMA had been formed as a 
charitable trust, the trust would have been invalid.  Notably, the bankruptcy 
court simply ignored this argument. 
Second, the Attorney General and the DIA claimed that Public Act 67 
of 1919, which authorized the DMA to transfer its assets to a “city 
empowered to maintain a public arts institute,” either perpetuated or 
created a charitable trust obligating Detroit to “perpetuate and ‘maintain a 
public art institute’ that would exhibit art to the general public, and to 
 
 130.  DONN ZARETSKY, There’s No Such Thing as the Public Trust, and It’s a Good 
Thing, Too, THE LEGAL GUIDE FOR MUSEUM PROFESSIONALS 151, 153 (Julia Courtney, ed. 
2015). 
 131.  In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 177 (2014). 
 132.  Conveyance or Transfer of DIA Collection, Mich. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 7272 at 18; 
Response of the Detroit Institute of Arts to Objections to the City’s Amended Plan of 
Confirmation, May 27, 2014, at 13. 
 133.  See generally Articles of Incorporation of the Detroit Museum of Art (1885). 
 134.  See, e.g., Chicago Bank of Commerce v. McPherson, 62 F.2d 393, 395 (6th Cir. 
1932) (“For nearly a hundred years prior to 1907 charitable trusts were not recognized by 
the laws of Michigan.”); see also Hopkins v. Crossley, 96 N.W. 499, 499–501 (Mich. 1903) 
(invalidating a nonprofit corporation’s attempt to create a charitable trust). 
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‘faithfully [ . . . ] use [. . .]’ the art conveyed for that purpose.135  The 
bankruptcy court apparently credited this claim, finding that Public Act 67 
“required that the ‘property so conveyed shall in the hands of said city be 
faithfully used for the purposes for which the [Detroit Museum of Art] was 
organized,’” and that the trustees of the DMA “believed the restrictions in 
PA 67 of 1919 ‘give assurance that the property cannot be used excepting 
for the same purposes as were provided for in the incorporation of the 
Detroit Museum of Art.’”136 
These arguments are also incorrect.  The terms under which the DMA 
transferred its assets to Detroit unequivocally show that no charitable trust 
was created, and that Detroit expressly rejected the DMA’s efforts to create 
a charitable trust.  The City created the Arts Commission and established 
the DIA before the DMA transferred its assets to the City.137  The DMA 
initially offered to sell its assets to the City subject to the condition that title 
would revert to the DMA if, among other things, the City “did not suitably 
provide for the care and maintenance of the collections of the Detroit 
Museum of Art.”138  The City rejected the DMA’s offer on the ground that 
it would only accept an unconditional transfer.139  And on December 29, 
1919, the City purchased the DMA’s assets for $35,863.22, pursuant to a 
bill of sale and two deeds that included no conditions. 
In other words, not only did the bill of sale and deeds not explicitly 
create a charitable trust, but also the City expressly refused to accept terms 
that might have created a charitable trust.  While the City may have had a 
statutory obligation to use the assets transferred to it by the DMA for the 
purpose of operating an art museum, it did not own those assets subject to a 
charitable trust.  And any wishful thinking to the contrary on the part of the 
trustees of the DMA is simply irrelevant. 
Third, the Attorney General and the DIA claimed that the City 
recognized or created a charitable trust by representing that it held the DIA 
art in charitable trust for the people of Michigan.140  The bankruptcy court 
also apparently credited this claim, observing that the May 15, 1984 
Operating Agreement between the City and the Founders Society “states 
that the City ‘has maintained and operated the DIA for over 60 years for 
the benefit of the citizens of the City and the State of Michigan’” and that 
 
 135.  Conveyance or Transfer of DIA Collection, Mich. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 7272, at 19; 
See also Response of the Detroit Institute of Arts to Objections to the City’s Amended Plan 
of Confirmation, May 27, 2014, at 14. 
 136.  In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 177. 
 137.  See Detroit City Charter (1918), Tit. III, Ch. XIX. 
 138.  See DMA Minutes, Feb. 18, 1919. 
 139.  See Arts Comm’n Minutes, June 2, 1919. 
 140.  State of Michigan, Mich. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 7272, at 20-21, available at 
http://www.ag.state.mi.us/opinion/datafiles/2010s/op10351.htm; see also Response of the 
Detroit Institute of Arts to Objections to the City’s Amended Plan of Confirmation, May 27, 
2014, at 15-16. 
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“the City would use state-allocated funds solely for the DIA, which was 
consistent with ‘the goal of continuing to benefit the citizens of the City 
and the State by preserving for their enjoyment the treasures of the 
DIA.’”141  Further, the court observed that “the DIA’s current Collection 
Management Policy states that ‘the [DIA] must be ever aware of its role as 
trustee of the collection for the benefit of the public’” and that “the façade 
of the DIA itself, built by the City in 1927, states that it is ‘Dedicated by 
the People of Detroit to the Knowledge and Enjoyment of Art.’”142 
These arguments are even more clearly incorrect.  None of these 
statements made by Detroit even colorably recognize or create a charitable 
trust.  They are mere hortatory language, reflecting the City’s commitment 
to benefit the people of Detroit and the State of Michigan.  Notably, with a 
few rare exceptions, the City refused to accept donations to the DIA subject 
to any conditions.  Not only did the City not recognize or create any 
charitable trusts, it affirmatively refused to accept donations that could be 
construed as creating charitable trusts.  In fact, many of the works in the 
DIA collection were simply purchased by the City with City funds. 
Notably, the bankruptcy court acknowledged that “the creditors did 
submit substantial evidence and legal grounds to support the contrary view 
that the City can legally sell or monetize the DIA art,” and observed that 
“the current DIA Operating Agreement states that ‘[t]he City shall retain 
title to and ownership of the (a) City art collection and (b) the DIA 
properties.’”143 
In sum, the bankruptcy court’s suggestion that the City could not sell 
the DIA art because it owned the DIA subject to a charitable trust is clearly 
incorrect.  The City owned the DIA art, and owned almost all of the DIA 
art subject to no restrictions.  Accordingly, it could have sold most of the 
DIA art at its discretion. 
Moreover, as a group of creditors observed, the DIA settlement itself 
expressly provided for the sale of the DIA to the DIA corporation. 
DIA Corp. and the Attorney General allege that the City is the trustee of 
a charitable trust encompassing the DIA Collection, held for the 
purposes set forth in the DMA’s 1885 Articles of Incorporation, namely 
“the public exhibition of its collection of works of art.”  By their logic, 
if the DIA Collection is held in charitable trust for the benefit of the 
people of the State of Michigan, and the terms of such trust provide that 
artwork may only be sold or encumbered to buy additional pieces of 
artwork, then the City has no right to monetize the artwork to satisfy its 
 
 141.  In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 178. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. 
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general municipal obligations (such as the repayment of its debts).  This 
is precisely what the City is doing pursuant to the Grand Bargain.144 
Likewise, Professor David Skeel recognized that the DIA settlement 
amounted to a sale of the DIA art to the private DIA corporation: 
The deal calls for Detroit to “sell” its art to a newly created trust that is 
required to keep the art in the city, using roughly $370 million raised 
from the Ford, Kresge, Knight and other foundations, $350 million from 
the state of Michigan (if the Republican legislature agrees) and the 
institute’s own funds.  Not only would the new entity keep the art in 
Detroit but also the entire $816 million would be used to pay Detroit’s 
pensioners.  The art world and Detroit’s pensioners both win. It’s 
almost like the deus ex machina solution to a Greek play.145 
If the City owned the DIA art subject to a charitable trust, then the 
DIA settlement violated that charitable trust in precisely the same way that 
the sale of the DIA art on the open market would have violated that 
charitable trust.  The bankruptcy court’s conclusion that the City could not 
sell the DIA art because the City owned the DIA art subject to a charitable 
trust is unconvincing not only because the bankruptcy court failed to 
identify any plausible reason to believe that a charitable trust existed, but 
also because the bankruptcy court approved the DIA settlement, under 
which the City sold the DIA art to the DIA corporation.  In other words, 
while the bankruptcy court found that the City could not sell the DIA art, 
by approving the DIA settlement, it actually held that the City could sell 
the DIA art. 
In a recent article largely tracking and elaborating on the arguments 
made by the Michigan Attorney General and the DIA corporation, Steven 
W. Golden argues that Detroit owned the DIA art subject to a charitable 
trust and therefore could not sell the DIA art.146  While Golden correctly 
argues that Detroit could have owned the DIA art subject to a charitable 
trust, and that Detroit could not sell the DIA art if it owned the DIA art 
subject to a charitable trust, he fails to show that Detroit actually owned the 
DIA art subject to a charitable trust.  Indeed, he relies on precisely the same 
unconvincing claims made by the Michigan Attorney General and the DIA 
corporation.  Not only did Detroit not expressly intend to create a charitable 
trust, it expressly rejected the DMA’s efforts to create a charitable trust. 
 
 144.  Joint Pretrial Brief in Support of Objection to the DIA Settlement, In re City of 
Detroit, 504 B.R. 97 (Feb. 21, 2014). 
 145.  David Skeel, Detroit’s clever and likely illegal art-for-pensions deal, 
WASHINGTON POST, May 9, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/detroits-
clever-and-likely-illegal-art-for-pensions-deal/2014/05/09/e3f93e84-cf1e-11e3-a6b1-
45c4dffb85a6_story.html?utm_term=.ad19647722f0. 
 146.  See generally, Steven W. Golden, In Art We Trust: The Intersection of Trust and 
Bankruptcy Law in Detroit, 48 TEX. TECH L. REV. 313 (2016). 
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Moreover, Golden fails to address the fact that the under the DIA 
settlement, Detroit actually did sell the DIA art to the DIA corporation.  Of 
course, Detroit sold the DIA art to the DIA corporation on the 
understanding that the DIA corporation would manage the DIA collection 
subject to the relevant professional standards (i.e. that it would sell works 
of art only in order to purchase works of art) and that the DIA corporation 
would remain in Detroit.  But the DIA settlement still amounted to the sale 
of a public asset to a private entity, the DIA corporation. 
2. Deaccessioning Standards Were Irrelevant and Indefensible 
The bankruptcy court also observed that “nationally accepted 
standards for museums prohibit the de-acquisition of art to pay debt,” and 
that “if the City sold any of its art to pay its debts, the national and 
international art community would refuse to do business with the DIA.”147  
And the bankruptcy court was correct, as far as it goes. 
The most important professional associations governing art museums 
are the American Alliance of Museums (“AAM”) and the Association of 
Art Museum Directors (“AAMD”).  Both the AAM and the AAMD have 
adopted policies governing “deaccessioning” or the de-acquisition of 
artworks.  “Deaccessioning is defined as the process by which a work of art 
or other object (collectively, a ‘work’), wholly or in part, is permanently 
removed from a museum’s collection.”148  The AAM and AAMD 
deaccessioning policies both permit museums to sell artworks in their 
collections only to purchase additional artworks, prohibit museums from 
selling works of art in their collections for any other purpose, including to 
pay operating expenses. 
The AAM Code of Ethics for Museums explicitly provides that the 
proceeds from deaccessioned works may only be used for acquisition or the 
care of the collection: 
The distinctive character of museum ethics derives from the ownership, 
care and use of objects, specimens, and living collections representing 
the world’s natural and cultural common wealth.  This stewardship of 
collections entails the highest public trust and carries with it the 
presumption of rightful ownership, permanence, care, documentation, 
accessibility and responsible disposal. 
Thus, the museum ensures that: 
. . . 
 
 147.  In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 178. 
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• disposal of collections through sale, trade or research activities 
is solely for the advancement of the museum’s mission.  
Proceeds from the sale of nonliving collections are to be used 
consistent with the established standards of the museum’s 
discipline, but in no event shall they be used for anything other 
than acquisition or direct care of collections.”149 
The AAMD Policy on Deaccessioning provides more specifically that 
proceeds from the sale of a deaccessioned artwork may only be used for 
acquisition, and explicitly provides that they may not be used for 
operations or capital expenses: 
I. Purpose of Deaccessioning and Disposal 
A. Deaccessioning is a legitimate part of the formation and care of 
collections and, if 
practiced, should be done in order to refine and improve the quality and 
appropriateness of the collections, the better to serve the museum’s 
mission. 
B. Funds received from the disposal of a deaccessioned work shall not 
be used for 
operations or capital expenses.  Such funds, including any earnings and 
appreciation thereon, may be used only for the acquisition of works in a 
manner 
consistent with the museum’s policy on the use of restricted acquisition 
funds. In 
order to account properly for their use, AAMD recommends that such 
funds, 
including any earnings and appreciation, be tracked separate from other 
acquisition funds.150 
The AAMD Policy on Deaccessioning also provides for imposing 
sanctions on member and nonmember museums that violate the policy: 
VIII. Sanctions 
In the event a member or museum violates one or more of the 
provisions of this Policy, the member may be subject to censure, 
suspension, and/or expulsion, and the museummay be subject to censure 
and/or sanctions in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Code 
of Ethics of the AAMD, which have been amended consistent with the 
following: 
 
 149.  American Alliance of Museums, Code of Ethics for Museums (2000), available at 
http://www.aam-us.org/resources/ethics-standards-and-best-practices/code-of-ethics. 
 150.  Association of Art Museum Directors Policy on Deaccessioning, supra note 149, 
at 4-5. 
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 A museum director shall only dispose of accessioned works of art in 
 accordance with the Professional Practices and the Task Force Report 
 adopted by the members on June 9, 2010, as the same may be 
 amended. 
 The Code of Ethics provides that AAMD members who violate the 
 Code may be subject to discipline by censure as determined by the 
 Board of Trustees of the AAMD and/or, suspension and/or expulsion 
 from the Association in accordance with the By-Laws of the AAMD. 
 Infractions by any art museum may expose that institution to censure 
 and/or sanctions, as determined by the Board of Trustees of the 
 AAMD, that may, in the case of sanctions, include, without 
 limitation, suspension of loans and shared exhibitions between the 
 sanctioned museum and museums of which AAMD members are 
 directors.151 
The AAM and AAMD claim that museums may not deaccession 
works of art for any purpose other than the purchase of works of art 
because they own their collections subject to the “public trust.”152  For 
example, the The AAM Code of Ethics for Museums repeatedly invokes 
the “public trust”: 
Thus, the museum ensures that: 
• collections in its custody support its mission and public trust 
responsibilities 
. . . 
• acquisition, disposal, and loan activities conform to its mission 
and public trust responsibilities 
. . . 
• collections-related activities promote the public good rather 
than individual financial gain153 
Likewise, the AAMD Policy on Deaccessioning invokes the “interests 
of the public”: 
Deaccession decisions must be made with great thoughtfulness, care, 
and prudence. Expressions of donor intent should always be respected 
in deaccession decisions and the interests of the public, for whose 
benefit collections are maintained, must always be foremost in making 
deaccession decisions.154 
 
 151.  Id. at 9-10. 
 152.  ZARETSKY, supra note 131, at 151. 
 153.  American Alliance of Museums Code of Ethics for Museums, supra note 150. 
 154.  Association of Art Museum Directors Policy on Deaccessioning, supra note 149, 
at 3. 
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And opponents of deaccessioning for any purpose other than 
purchasing artwork have eagerly adopted this argument.155  For example, 
the Michigan Attorney General and the DIA both argued, inter alia, that 
the City could not sell the DIA art because it owned the DIA art subject to 
the “public trust.”156 
However, the argument that art museums own the artworks in their 
collections subject to the “public trust” is obviously false and borders on 
ridiculous.  As observed above, the “public trust” doctrine only applies to 
natural resources like navigable waters and parks, not chattel property like 
artworks.157  But more damningly, if art museums owned works of art 
subject to the “public trust” then they could not sell them for any purpose, 
including the purchase of artwork.  And that is simply not the case. In fact, 
charitable art museums can legally sell works of art from their collection 
for any purpose that is consistent with their charitable mission.158  And 
non-charitable art museums can legally sell works of art from their 
collection for any reason or no reason, at their discretion. 
Indeed, the AAM and AAMD positions on deaccessioning are simply 
incoherent.  If art museums own the artworks in their collections subject to 
the “public trust,” then they cannot sell those works for any reason, 
including the purchase of artworks.  As Donn Zaretsky has repeatedly and 
amusingly observed, either art museums own the artworks in their 
collections subject to the “public trust,” or they do not.  The AAM and 
AAMD wish to have their cake and eat it too. 
Of course, the AAM and AAMD, as well as other opponents of 
deaccessioning artwork for any purpose other than purchasing artwork, 
actually rely on “ethical” rather than legal arguments. In other words, while 
art museums can legally sell artworks from their collections for any reason, 
including operations and capital costs, they should not do so. 
And yet, it is unclear why it is “ethical” to sell artworks in order to 
buy artworks, but “unethical” to sell artworks for other purposes.  For 
example, under the AAM and AAMD guidelines, it is “unethical” for an art 
museum to sell a work of art in order to avoid bankruptcy.  As a 
consequence, art museums facing financial crises have been forced to 
close, when the sale of a single artwork could have covered their expenses.  
Most recently, the Corcoran Museum of American Art found itself in 
precisely this situation, and we lost an American institution.  Would it 
really have been “unethical” for the Corcoran to have sold an artwork in 
order to maintain its existence?  Would it really be “unethical” for a 
 
 155.  ZARETSKY, supra note 131, at 151. 
 156.  See supra notes 132-48 and accompanying text. 
 157.  See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
 158.  See generally Mark S. Gold, Monetizing the Collection: The Intersection of Law, 
Ethics, and Trustee Prerogative, in THE LEGAL GUIDE FOR MUSEUM PROFESSIONALS 127 
(Julia Courtney, ed. 2015). 
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museum to sell an artwork from its collection in order to provide free 
admission?  Would it really be “unethical” for a university art museum to 
sell an artwork in order to provide scholarships? 
Indeed, a modicum of cynicism suggests an alternative reason that the 
AAM and AAMD rules might prohibit museums from selling artworks 
from their collections for any purpose other than purchasing artworks: 
supply and demand.  Artwork is an asset, and the people who own artworks 
want to internalize the value of their assets.  Art museums obtain artworks 
primarily by way of donations, for which the donor is entitled to a tax 
deduction based on the value of the work. And the value of artwork 
depends primarily on scarcity.  If museums sold artworks from their 
collections for the purpose of raising cash, they would be competing with 
their benefactors.  The AAM and AAMD prohibitions on museums selling 
artwork for any purpose other than purchasing artwork means that donating 
an artwork to a museum effectively preserves scarcity.  And museums 
selling artwork in order to buy artwork is tolerated by donors because it is 
effectively a wash. While it reduces scarcity of one artist’s work, it 
increases scarcity of another. 
Of course, this interpretation of the AAM and AAMD rules on 
deaccessioning calls into question their foundation in “ethical” principles.  
Not only do they impose restrictions that needlessly prevent museums from 
selling artworks for socially beneficial purposes, but also there is good 
reason to believe that they effectively serve to further cartelize the art 
market. 
In sum, the AAM and AAMD deaccessioning rules do not, cannot, 
and should not prevent art museums from selling artworks from their 
collection for socially beneficial purposes, including to cover operations 
and capital expenses.  They are not legally binding and are based on 
“ethical” principles of dubious legitimacy.  And in any case, they were 
entirely irrelevant to the City’s ability to sell the DIA art. 
B. The Best Interests of the Creditors 
In both its oral and written opinions the bankruptcy court concluded 
that the DIA settlement was in the best interests of the creditors, because 
the City would not and should not sell the DIA art.  The court observed that 
the City refused to sell the DIA art at auction and make the proceeds 
available to its creditors.  And the court agreed with the City’s decision, 
finding that the DIA was essential to the future of Detroit.  The court was 
correct on both counts. 
Under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Act, a bankruptcy court hearing a 
municipal bankruptcy action can only confirm or dismiss the municipality’s 
plan of adjustment.159  It cannot modify the plan of adjustment or force the 
 
 159.  11 U.S.C. § 943 (2012). 
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municipality to sell any municipal assets.  As a consequence, a 
municipality’s plan of adjustment is in the best interest of the creditors and 
should be affirmed by the bankruptcy court so long as it provides “a better 
alternative for creditors than what they already have.”160 
The bankruptcy court correctly concluded that the City’s plan of 
adjustment was in the best interests of the creditors, because it provided the 
largest recovery the creditors could expect to receive.  The court correctly 
refused to consider the value of the DIA art in determining whether the 
City’s plan of adjustment was in the best interest of the creditors, because 
neither the creditors nor the court could force the City to sell the DIA art.  
The value of the DIA art was irrelevant because the creditors were not 
entitled to collect it. 
Moreover, the City’s plan of adjustment was manifestly in the best 
interests of the creditors, because it effectively gave them part of the value 
of the DIA art, to which they were otherwise not entitled.  As explained 
above, while the court held that the City could not sell the DIA art, under 
the DIA settlement, the City effectively sold the DIA art to the DIA 
corporation, and used the proceeds to compensate its creditors.  The court 
correctly concluded that the DIA settlement and the plan of adjustment as a 
whole were in the best interests of the creditors because they provided the 
creditors with as much as they could reasonably expect to receive.  “The 
Court finds that the City has made reasonable efforts to monetize its assets 
to satisfy the best interests of creditors test.”161 
Finally, the court correctly concluded that the DIA settlement was in 
the best interests of the City as a whole.  As the court observed, even if the 
City could sell the DIA art, it should not do so. 
However, even if the law did give the Court some authority here, the 
Court would not have interfered with the City’s decision.  The City 
made the only appropriate decision. Maintaining the art at the DIA is 
critical to the feasibility of the City’s plan and to the City’s future. . . . 
To sell the DIA art would only deepen Detroit’s fiscal, economic and 
social problems.  To sell the DIA art would be to forfeit Detroit’s 
future.  The City made the right decision.162 
The DIA is one of the most important art museums in the United 
States, if not the world.  The bankruptcy court correctly concluded that the 
City’s refusal to liquidate the DIA art was in the best interests of the City of 
Detroit, and that the DIA settlement was in the best interests of the 
creditors, given that it provided them with the largest recovery they could 
 
 160.  In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 213 (2014) (citing In re Pierce Cnty. Hous. 
Auth., 414 B.R. 702, 718 (2009)). 
 161.  Id. at 219. 
 162.  Id. at 218. 
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expect, and arguably a larger recovery than that to which they were entitled 
by law. 
CONCLUSION 
The bankruptcy court confirmed the City of Detroit’s plan of 
adjustment and the DIA settlement because it found that the City could not, 
would not, and should not sell the DIA.  Its finding that the City could not 
sell the DIA art was incorrect, but its recognition that the City would not 
and should not sell the DIA art were correct and entirely adequate on their 
own.  Or rather, the bankruptcy court correctly recognized that the City was 
entitled to monetize the DIA art on its own terms and consistent with the 
best interests of the city, rather than simply liquidating the collection. 
But the DIA settlement does not support the claim that museums 
cannot deaccession artworks for the purpose of paying operating or capital 
costs. In fact, it stands for the opposite.  The City of Detroit did sell the 
DIA art, and it sold the DIA art for the purpose of satisfying its debts. 
Independent art museums ought to be able to do the same. 
 
